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Simmel’s reading of Nietzsche: The promise of “philosophical sociology” 
Abstract 
This article explores Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche to illuminate the dynamics of ethical 
agency in his late life-philosophy. The main argument is that Simmel’s reworking of the Nietzschean 
themes of the will to power, distinction, and self-overcoming lays the ground for his vitalist ethics in 
The View of Life. An integrative reading across Simmel’s intellectual biography points to the 
relevance of the Nietzschean doctrine of eternal return for Simmel’s critique of abstract Kantian 
morality. The Nietzschean promise of life-affirmation is problematized in relation to the broader 
project of sociological metaphysics, which transgresses the boundaries between classical sociology 
and social philosophy. Opening up the grounds for a more sustained investigation into Simmel’s 
engagement with Nietzsche, this article resonates with contemporary discussions on the ethics of the 
relational self and sociological vitalism. 
Keywords 
Eternal return, ethical individualism, Nietzsche, self, sociality, Simmel, vitalism 
Simmel’s writings offer a variety of vantage points for conceptualizing individuality, pushing the 
sociological imagination to all kinds of limits, such as the self-referential metaphysics of life (Button, 
2012: 153) and the mysticism of negative theology (Vandenberghe, 2010: 7). Regardless of the path 
we choose to follow, we arrive at some notion of a synthesis. Pyyhtinen (2010: 142; 2012: 284), for 
instance, argues for the originality of Simmel’s approach in that the classical homo duplex 
perspective turns into individuum duplex as the social (relational) and the personal (non-sociated) 
dimensions of life become reconciled via the indivisible unity of the individual. Perhaps a similar kind 
of synthesis underlines Simmel’s notion of a conceptually perfect society reconstructed in discussions 
on Simmel’s utopia (Dodd, 2012: 153). In How Is Society Possible? the promise of a “fundamental 
harmony between the individual and the social whole” (Simmel, 2009: 50) is offered only to be 
withdrawn: the conceptually perfect society functions as a neo-Kantian regulative fiction – an 
intuitively enacted imperative that underwrites agents’ knowledge of social life. Below the level of 
consciousness, we anticipate an ideal harmony in which our “being-for-itself, self-determining 
personality” can flourish while “playing a necessary part in the life of the whole” (Simmel, 2009: 52) – 
a state in which what is most unique and distinctive about individual personality becomes cultivated, 
rather than absorbed into the social whole. 
Synthesis is also at the heart of the notion of “sociological metaphysics” recently reconstructed in 
the discussions on the relevance of Simmel’s project for contemporary subjectivities (Harrington and 
Kemple, 2012: 10). In the closing chapter of Soziologie, Simmel (2009) returns to the ideal of a 
pervasive harmony between the individual and society: 
The more unique someone is, the more one occupies a place that can be filled only by that person 
according to one’s being, action, and fate and the more that place is reserved for that person 
alone in the order of the whole, the more is this whole to be grasped as a unity, a metaphysical 
organism in which every soul is a member, unable to be exchanged with any other, but 
presupposing all others and their working together for one’s own life. 
 
(p. 660) 
This is a passage where various ways of navigating through Simmel’s thinking meet: we can read it 
from the perspective of relational sociology where individuality is a function of difference subject to 
social relations, as an anticipation of Simmel’s life-philosophy that centres around the unique 
individual, in hermeneutic terms of the balance between the whole and parts, or as a sign of 
Simmel’s metaphysical, or even mystical longing (see Vandenberghe, 2010). The religious reading 
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may be on the edge of contemporary sociological discourse, but it is no less relevant. As Harrington 
and Kemple (2012: 10) point out, Simmel illustrates the notion of a synthesis with the Christian 
doctrine of the soul in which “individuals [...] are not only the sums of the qualities whereby they 
were naturally as different as those qualities are, but apart from those, each one is an absolute entity 
by virtue of personhood, freedom, and immortality” (Simmel, 2009: 661). In other words, 
individuality cannot be merely assembled at the intersection of social threads but involves an 
irreducible dimension of singularity. 
The notions of a synthesis and God are rather odd places to encounter Nietzsche. Yet in 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1986 [1907]) – a book Simmel considered his “chief work” (Liebersohn, 
1988: 142) – we find him arguing that “in both Nietzsche’s thinking and in Christianity, the aim is to 
integrate the full and mature personality – who is the absolute bearer of value in this world – into a 
transcending meaning and goal structure of existence” (Simmel, 1986: 143). This passage reveals more 
than the originality of Simmel’s philosophical stance, as it foreshadows the ways in which Simmel’s 
synthesizing of various intellectual traditions will culminate a decade later in The View of Life, where 
value becomes ultimately embedded in the life process. We glimpse here the role Nietzsche – or rather 
a peculiar moral complexion of his thought – plays on Simmel’s route towards the life-philosophical 
conception of the sovereign self as a nexus of modern ethics. This role is ambivalent and puzzling in 
many respects: Simmel’s critique unfolds in a complex matrix of ideas, which locates Nietzsche not only 
in close relation to Christianity, but also Kant’s philosophical ethics. 
There is a lot to be gained in unpacking the web of concepts that connects Simmel and Nietzsche: 
some scholars suggest that Simmel’s response to the tragedy of modern culture can be 
reconstructed precisely from this encounter (Frisby, 1987: 906, Pyyhtinen, 2008: 287, Weinstein and 
Weinstein, 1993: 124). Among various voices that acknowledge Simmel’s debt to the Nietzschean 
philosophy (Aschheim, 1992: 42, Frisby, 1985: 35, Liebersohn, 1988: 141–142, Lukács, 1980 [1962]: 
442; Stauth and Turner, 1988: 206, Weinstein and Weinstein, 1993: 171–185), Levine (2012: 31) has 
most recently placed Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche alongside his interest in Goethe: both 
philosophers represent “the principle of Life” in Simmel’s broader socio-metaphysical project. Yet 
only few investigations offer a more sustained insight into the recurring presence of Nietzsche within 
Simmel’s social theory (see exceptions: Button, 2012; Dodd, 2013; Lichtblau, 1984). As Weinstein and 
Weinstein (1993: 179) suggest, the multitude of threads one can follow in tracing Simmel’s 
Nietzsche(s) makes it impossible to ever draw a comprehensive picture of this complex affinity. With 
a thinker like Nietzsche, whose work deprives us of the fake comfort of definitive answers, such a 
quest would be perhaps self-defeating. Simmel (1986) himself warns us that “it is possible to select 
interpretations from Nietzsche’s writings that uncompromisingly contradict my interpretation of 
him,” though in a typically modernist fashion, he still aims to convey their “objective importance” (p. 
lv). 
Leaving aside the question whether he succeeds – and if objective meaning can be ever found in 
Nietzsche – reconstructing Simmel’s critique can arguably shed light on his late moral philosophy, 
opening up crucial tensions in the life-philosophical conception of the individual subject as a locus of 
moral actions, so far neglected in discussions on Simmel’s sociological vitalism and his ethics of the 
self (Lash, 2005; Lee and Silver, 2012). Seen from within Simmel’s biography, Nietzsche’s importance 
lies in his “immoralism,” which is anything but a negation of morals (Simmel, 1986: 160). This is the 
line of argumentation framing this article, which aims to trace the connection between Simmel’s 
reading of Nietzsche and his late moral thought.  
The discussion unfolds in four steps. First, I review and reconstruct the key themes of Simmel’s 
engagement with Nietzsche, drawing on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1986 [1907]), Simmel’s review 
of Ferdinand Tönnies’ Nietzsche-Kultus (1897) and a series of articles from Simmel’s middle period, 
which have not been translated into English: Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Moralphilosophische Silhouette 
(1992a [1986]), Zum Verständnis Nietzsches (1995b [1902]), Nietzsche und Kant (1993 [1906]), and 
Nietzsche’s Moral (2011 [1911]).1 In the second section, I consider the points on which Simmel 
fundamentally disagrees with Nietzsche, with a focus on Simmel’s socio-metaphysical reworking of 
the doctrine of the will to power and his controversial account of Nietzsche’s close relationship to 
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Christianity. Reconstructing Simmel’s early-days critique lays grounds for the third, crucial section, 
where I trace the Nietzschean resonances in The View of Life (2010 [1917]) and provocatively argue 
that Simmel exaggerates his distance from Nietzsche in order to dramatize his break with Kant. 
Concluding, I draw broader implications of this encounter following the integrative line of critique 
that brings together Simmel’s social and moral theory (Harrington and Kemple, 2012; Lee and Silver, 
2012; Levine, 2012). Opening up the grounds for a more sustained investigation into Simmel’s 
engagement with Nietzsche, this article argues for the contemporary relevance of Simmel’s notion of 
philosophical sociology as a helpful starting point for reconsidering the interplay between social 
philosophy and classical sociology in the context of the broader project of “sociological metaphysics.” 
 
Simmel’s reading of Nietzsche 
Simmel’s critique brings into sharp focus both the normative and affirmative aspects of Nietzsche’s 
canonical post-1882 works including The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, 
Twilight of the Idols, and The Case of Wagner. The appeal Simmel finds in Nietzsche rests on a life-
philosophical approach towards his writings: he warns us both against rejecting Nietzsche’s 
philosophy “ex cathedra” as a theoretical system (Simmel, 1992a: 116–117) and translating it into a 
reaction “political or especially social in character” (Simmel, 1994: 12). For Simmel (1994), the danger 
of the latter is evident in the ways “the new German youth” distorted Nietzsche’s call for the 
revaluation of all values as a “justification for an unrestrained egoism” (p. 14). Similarly, Simmel 
(1897) argues, Tönnies “pushes Nietzsche to the absurd” in failing to acknowledge that Nietzsche’s 
critique of slave morality is not the last step in the project of uprooting Western morality, but paves 
the way towards a new form of “objective idealism” (pp. 1646–1647), which could potentially bridge 
the gap between normativity and individualism. This is precisely the direction in which Simmel 
himself takes Nietzsche’s arguments ten years later in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Arguably, this 
book can be read as a continuation of Simmel’s longstanding interest in “popularizing” Nietzsche’s 
moral philosophy as an “intellectual causa sui” (Simmel, 1992a: 116) which takes life of its own 
beyond the decadent vocabulary, in a way that overturns rationalist and idealist interpretations of 
the ethical as a function of goals and consequences, opening up towards a more dynamic and 
creative process of realizing value from within the life process. 
On Simmel’s reading, Nietzsche offers an entirely new perspective on the relationship between 
individual personality and social structure with his distinction between the vantage points of 
humanity and society – a “breakthrough” in conceptualizing individuality beyond social relations 
(Simmel, 1986: 144). This distinction should be understood as a counterpoint against a fetishized 
understanding of the latter: society, like the concepts of nature or God in the past, has been used as 
an all-embracing, “flexible,” and “undefined” explanatory category at best, or a “dogma” at worst 
(Simmel, 1986: 144). With such consideration, Simmel does not aim to push the Nietzschean 
correlation of humanity and individuality to its “antisociological” extremes (see Frisby, 1987: 907), 
but rather, to negotiate the Nietzschean ideal of a fundamentally sovereign mode of existence, which 
renders the most extraordinary individuals as bearers of all value. Simmel (1986) insists that these 
values, which culminate in the high points of humanity, are “only realized through socially formed 
existence,” thus Nietzsche “underestimates the importance of social formation even for the 
development of individual values” (p. 145). This critique is mostly reflective of the direction in which 
Simmel himself will develop Nietzsche’s arguments. Indeed, he immediately adds that “even 
Nietzsche” overcomes the myth of the self-sufficient, isolated individual, paraphrasing his famous 
dictum from the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche proclaims that the doer is merely a fiction 
added to the deed (Simmel, 1986: 145). What is at stake here, for Simmel, is of course neither the 
deconstruction of the subject nor even a more nuanced conception of causal agency, but the broader 
problem of a synthesis between the self and society. 
This brings us to the question about the impact of Nietzsche’s attempt to rethink the problem of 
the individual on the development of Simmel’s own thought, which I will  reconsider in the last 
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section. For now, it is important to understand the importance of the Nietzschean distinction 
between the vantage points of humanity and society. For Simmel (1992a), it involves an important 
shift in the moral theory of value: “a very peculiar turn [...] from the subjectively-human to the 
objective” (p. 120). This is where we enter a “sublime” realm in which the subjective and objective – 
or the self and society – are no longer in opposition: “it is not subjective pleasure that Nietzsche 
commands men to seek, but exactly the reverse, the objective completeness of being” (Simmel, 1994: 
14).  
Simmel’s interest in “objective idealism” can be qualified if we follow his reworking of the 
Nietzschean ideal of distinction (Vornehmheit) understood as the expansion of the self towards an 
ever-deferred horizon of excellence. The significance of this ideal has been widely recognized, 
particularly in relation to Simmel’s sociological treatment of distance (see Aschheim, 1992: 42; 
Liebersohn, 1988: 141; Lichtblau, 1984: 232) and forms of modern individualism in the sphere of 
mature money economy (see Dodd, 2013). In the context of Simmel’s intellectual biography, 
Vornehmheit plays a central role in Simmel’s (1897) defence of the Nietzschean philosophy as an 
inherently “moral” project (p. 1648), against predominantly negative responses of his own 
intellectual circle.2 On Simmel’s (1992a) reading, the Nietzschean rapture with consequentialist and 
utilitarian traditions in philosophy is nothing less than a “Copernican deed,” which reverses the 
direction of ethics, as value becomes grounded in the expansive life-process (p. 124). 
In Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Simmel explores various aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy to 
defend this interpretation, but not without critical moves. Most importantly, he turns against neo-
Darwinian evolutionism, insofar as it rests on a tautological theory of “objective” moral value 
grounded in the existence of few extraordinary individuals. For Simmel (1986), this kind of 
evolutionary ethic is a dead-end: “real evolution produces the negative with the same disinterested 
necessity as it generates the positive” (p. 165), but the ideal of infinite growth emerges in a more 
positive light when bounded through the doctrine of eternal return, understood as an attitude to life, 
rather than a cosmological or metaphysical theory. Simmel (1986) follows closely Nietzsche’s point 
about its emotional and moral significance, despite evaluating the doctrine as conceptually 
incoherent from a logical standpoint: the circular understanding of time yields an “enormous 
responsibility of man in light of the externalization of action by its continuous repetition” (p. 178).3 
Once bounded through the relation of self-responsibility, Simmel (1986) renders the ideal of nobility 
“the most sublime of sublimations” which “does not force life to go beyond itself into the 
transcendent realm” (p. 180). 
Nobility, for Simmel (1986), should be then not taken literally, or even in socio-historical terms, 
but as a “special value-quality of the soul” (p. 179), perhaps a “nobility of mind” as Dodd (2013: 49) 
suggests. Simmel’s reworking of this concept has been discussed in terms of his intellectual debt to 
Nietzsche and Meister Eckhart (see Lichtblau, 1984; Vandenberghe, 2010: 22), but it is less clear what 
is at stake here in sociological terms. This dimension comes to the forefront in the Excursus on the 
Nobility in The Expansion of the Group and the Development of Individuality in Soziologie. Simmel 
(2009) argues here that nobility should be understood as a “special form of a unity of individuals” (p. 
641) where “the value of the whole extends through each individual” (p. 648). Each representative 
inherits a socio-historical “foundation” that benefits him, but it is simultaneously “balanced by the 
formative strength rising to a certain extent out of the individual” (Simmel, 2009: 648). The 
distinction between the “decadent” and “more excellent” manifestations of nobility is important 
here: the latter involves a “feeling of [...] strong independence, but also of responsibility” (Simmel, 
2009: 648). Only if bounded through such self-relation, the individual can flourish, becoming more 
than merely a superfluous link to the whole. This explains why Simmel (1986) criticizes Nietzsche for 
failing to stress out “that the specificity of his ideals is indivisibly linked to an essential and necessary 
mood of responsibility” (p. 169). Contextualizing Simmel’s (2009) distinction in this way, we glimpse 
again the promise of a synthesis, where “the self-sufficient, self-responsible, and satisfying existence 
is not a departure from the general well-being [...] but their development, protection, and 
enlargement” (p. 651). 
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Reconstructing the most important themes of Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche reveals a 
peculiar matrix of ideas, in which the self and society – or more broadly value (morals) and life – are 
no longer in opposition. Simmel’s (2009) sociological understanding of nobility as a “solution to the 
balance between the whole and the individual” (p. 651) illustrates what are the stakes here: a new 
vocabulary to envision a synthesis between individual personality and social structure. As we will see, 
this synthesis becomes moralized a decade later in The View of Life where Simmel puts forward his 
life-philosophical conception of the subject. In this sense, Simmel’s engagement with the 
Nietzschean notions of humanity, qualitative evlution and nobility surely allows him to problematize 
and rework various themes such as individuality, value, and society, but is there possibly some 
broader affinity between the thinkers? 
 
Nietzsche, Christianity, and the will to power 
Lukács (1980 [1962]), one of Simmel’s most distinctive students, argues for a close proximity: “the 
only difference between them was that Nietzsche stated the aristocratic bias in an overt, 
reactionary-militant manner whereas Simmel, in accordance with the pre-war social situation, 
contented himself with a haughty aloofness from the ‘crowd’” (p. 456). This might be an exaggerated 
account of the affinity between Simmel and Nietzsche – perhaps mostly reflective of Lukács’ 
characteristic distaste for “nihilistic” tendencies in “imperialist” Germany – but it raises an important 
question that has been deferred so far. Beyond Simmel’s efforts to capture Nietzsche as a “moralist,” 
are there some points on which Simmel fundamentally disagrees with the philosopher? This section 
sheds more light on these aspects of Simmel’s reading, with a focus on his reworking of the doctrine 
of the will to power and his controversial account of Christianity’s “close relation” (Simmel, 1986: 
142) to Nietzsche. 
Simmel argues that the will to power illustrates Nietzsche’s doctrine of values “at its climatic 
point” but only if it is “utilized beyond the domain of brutality where at first blush it seems to apply” 
(Simmel, 1986: 158). Leaving aside the questions about the nature of power dynamics in Nietzsche’s 
thought, and whether Simmel captures their complexity, Simmel’s broader aim here is to move 
beyond the traditional axiological conception of value in favour of a life-metaphysical understanding 
of the social: 
Nietzsche should at least have made the boundary lines clear between his will to power and bare 
desire for possession, showing that there is value only in the qualities of individual souls expressed 
in social relations, and not in the external realities of domination and force. Only a metaphysical 
concept of life [...] could properly respond to the objections against a doctrine of rapine. For such 
a metaphysical interpretation, individuals would only be containers and forms, deprived of any 
real significance, inasmuch as the essential process of life as a whole would occur within and 
beyond them. 
 
(Simmel, 1986: 159) 
Simmel’s (1986) efforts to downplay Nietzsche’s “pathos of distance” culminate in his speculations 
about a quasi-vitalist society without the “dominating, surging, and all-consuming distance” in which 
“life flows constantly through all individual beings, giving meaning and significance to accidentally 
adapted forms” (p. 159). Consisting of individuals with evolving boundaries of selfhood, this society 
would be relatively unequal – as a result of individuals’ unique positions on the floating matrix of life 
– yet one where the vital energy, starting from but non-exclusive to organic life, would flow as if 
“accidentally,” through each individual: “individual bearers of life would not have the right to make 
any special demands” (Simmel, 1986: 159).4 Deprived of the “aristocratic pathos,” this speculative 
image is perhaps less of a utopia, than a sketch of Simmel’s later life-metaphysical standpoint. This is 
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precisely the direction in which Simmel (2001) takes Nietzsche’s argument four years later in his 
article Nietzsche’s Moral, linking the doctrine of the will to power to the humanistic notion of 
evolution, understood not anymore in “a limited Darwinian sense,” but as a struggle against the 
decline of life’s creative powers, a struggle towards “more-life” (mehr-Leben) (p. 171). In this sense, 
Simmel endorses Nietzsche’s evolutionism in its creative, self-generative dimension, and the will to 
power emerges as a vehicle for expansive individualism in relation to man as a species-being, rather 
than as a metaphysical principle of life’s self-organization. 
What is then the precise link between the concepts of evolution, value, and individualism in this 
web of ideas? This is where – rather surprisingly – Simmel’s understanding of Christianity proves 
relevant. Perhaps provocatively, Simmel (1986) insists on a “great misunderstanding on Nietzsche’s 
part” (1986: 140) when it comes to the Christian tradition. The argument is more nuanced than we 
might be tempted to think, because Simmel (1986) is of course well aware of Nietzsche’s distaste for 
Christianity as a system of value judgments on “corrupt and declining life” (Simmel, 1986: 139). 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s very “starting point,” according to Simmel (1986: 5), is Christianity’s institutional 
decline and enduring “spiritual” significance: with the death of God, the enterprise of giving meaning 
to life is not yet over. Moreover, in the final chapters of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Simmel (1986) 
goes on to rehearse Nietzsche’s suspicions against slave morality, bad conscience, and herd instincts. 
In this context, the claim that Nietzsche “overlooks the Christian emphasis on the value of one’s own 
soul” (Simmel, 1986: 140) is perhaps best understood as an argument in the theory of value rather 
than in the history of morality. Most Nietzsche scholars would surely insist that the two are 
inseparable, but let me briefly consider Simmel’s argument, given the central role of the Christian 
doctrine in Simmel’s speculations on “sociological metaphysics.” 
In the passage above, Simmel (1986) refers to centripetal value stemming from life’s creative 
powers – value to be found in “the soul in its inner qualities” rather than, as any deontological 
argument would hold, “in the [...] action itself” (pp. 140–141). In this sense, the object of one’s 
actions becomes profoundly irrelevant – unlike in the ethic of Kant, democracy and socialism. The 
Calvinist doctrine of predestination illustrates the point in a “strange and paradoxical way:” if 
believers act “virtuously” it is not because “action has religious value” – whatever they do is 
irrelevant to their salvation – but “they merely activate a mechanism that allows for recognition of a 
religious value situation” (Simmel, 1986: 141). Simmel’s understanding of Christianity here is surely 
reflective of the rationalistic paradigm he explicates in the Sociology of Religion, where the religious 
is defined as a quality of social relationships, but in insisting that “the ultimate Christian concern is 
not with the negation of self [...] but with the internal quality of the person” (Simmel, 1986: 141), he 
seems to complicate the broader thesis that religion has a predominantly collective character. 
The argument rests on a renewed view of Christianity as providing conditions for highest 
individuation, which comes to the forefront in Simmel’s essay On the Salvation of the Soul from 1905. 
As Simmel (1997) puts it: “Christians have failed to take account of all the individualism inherent in 
the Christian concept of salvation, the idea that each person should make the most of his own 
talent” (p. 34). On Simmel’s interpretation, the Christian concept of an after-life involves religious 
differentiation, rather than conformity: 
The more the soul’s salvation is based on it’s individuality, possibly beyond comparison with any 
other, the less the person will be able to find respite from having to concentrate on what is most 
personal and unique within the individual. The more perilous life is, the more exposed the 
individual’s spiritual conviction, the more complete is his responsibility for his own self. 
 
(Simmel, 1997: 34) 
The last sentence in this passage sheds some light on the most puzzling aspect of Simmel’s 
reading: if the Christian doctrine of salvation radicalizes individual’s responsibility for herself during 
her earthly life, then Nietzsche might have possibly misunderstood the Christian doctrine of the soul 
as an “insurance policy” (Simmel, 1986: 141). For Simmel (1997), even the Calvinist belief in pre-
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destination involves a “terrible inner danger” (p. 35). This resonates with Simmel’s reading of the 
Nietzschean category of expansive life which is free from external demands, indifferent to 
intentionality and thus: “partakes of the category of danger: the steeper the ascent, which alone 
makes existence worthwhile [...] the greater the danger of losing one’s balance” (Simmel, 1986: 141). 
If Simmel (1986) is serious about the link between Christianity and Nietzsche, the critical move is to 
show that the lived experience of Christianity is also a site of struggle and creatively realized value 
“under the sign of danger,” rather than the nihilistic “desire for security, warmth and peace” which 
Simmel indeed – recall Lukács’ criticism – attributes to the “broad masses of the bourgeoisie” (p. 
141) rather than Christians. This account is surely controversial, but it helps to clarify what is at stake 
in Simmel’s reworking of the Nietzschean and Christian doctrines: a new theory of value to envisage 
a sovereign mode of individuality. 
With this link, we arrive rather unexpectedly at the concept of the never-attainable Übermensch. 
On Simmel’s reading, it is a “name for the higher level of the same” (Simmel, 1995b: 59) rather than 
an entirely new stage in the development of humanity. Just as the doctrine of eternal return, it is 
best understood as an immanent imperative, a “functional ideal” of self-overcoming (Simmel, 1986: 
175). This is where being (form) and becoming (life) merge in a synthesis, which is never absolute as 
any attempt to conceptualize life towards infinity involves irreconcilable tensions. These tensions 
find expression in an intriguing metaphor about the “dangerous proximity” of the Übermensch, who 
is at the same time “boundlessly distant” (Simmel, 1992a: 129). The paradox of distant closeness 
points towards the imminence of the danger that arises with the stark realization that life carries its 
own furthering. The same idea underpins Simmel’s (1986) interpretation of Christianity: only 
precarious, harsh, ever “more disciplined and severe” (p. 169) life can potentially save the individual. 
This is the kind of life in which everything is at stake, a life that ascends through struggle, ultimately 
embodied in the figure of the “noble man” who “must demand unbending severity towards himself 
and others” as only sacrifice yields “highest personal values” (Simmel, 1986: 168). Following 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Simmel (1986) insists that human species is a question that 
remains open without an end or limit: “man is still a path and a bridge” (p. 175). This is one of the 
most important aspects of Simmel’s reading: Nietzsche’s concept of disciplined life, which is “always 
richer in responsibility” (Simmel, 1992a: 123), will prove particularly relevant for Simmel’s vitalist 
ethics. 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche ends with Simmel’s typical move to “enliven” the contrasting 
perspectives of the two philosophers (Pyyhtinen, 2010: 63), as he puts forward a conception of an 
expansive self which “enjoys the embrace” of both “the desperation and jubilation of life as the poles 
of its own expansion, its own power, its own plenitude of forms” (Simmel, 1986: 181). Most readers 
and critics agree that Nietzschean cheerfulness seems to win over Schopenhauer’s pessimism in this 
passage (Frisby, 1987: 907; Pyyhtinen, 2010: 53), which is apparent both in the way Simmel frames 
his conclusion – as an existential, life-philosophical imperative which eludes “a logical 
understanding” – and in a more substantive sense. Following Simmel’s reworking of the Nietzschean 
doctrine of the will to power, the very dualism of desperation and jubilation can be perhaps 
understood as a “more-life,” which ascends through the experiences of “pain, oppression and 
sacrifice” (Simmel, 1986: 166). The emerging conception of an expansive self, bounded through the 
relation of self-responsibility, throws us directly into The View of Life, in which this self-relation 
emerges as the very nexus of modern ethics. 
The View of Life: Beyond Nietzsche and Kant? 
Although The View of Life contains only three direct references to Nietzsche, various scholars draw 
attention to numerous, if implicit, Nietzschean resonances throughout the book, such as Simmel’s 
appeal to strength (Vandenberghe, 2010: 22), his vision of sovereign personality (Lee and Silver, 
2012: 133) and life’s self-transcendent and ultimately tragic structure (Button, 2012: 153; Pyyhtinen, 
2010: 53). Lash (2006: 325) offers a thoroughly Nietzschean reading of Simmel’s sociological vitalism, 
in which Nietzsche’s slave moralities become “social forms.” Such interpretation risks obscuring 
Dominika Partyga I London School of Economics I Department of Sociology 
 8 
important nuances in Simmel’s sharp critique, but, as Kron (2001: 115) argues, the very dualism of 
life and form framing Simmel’s work certainly resonates with the Nietzschean distinction between 
the Dionysian and Apollonian. The interplay of life and form emerging from The View of Life also 
unfolds under the sign of tension, where any genuine unity – found briefly in diverse socio-cultural 
forms – ultimately dissolves. Seen from a vitalist standpoint of life’s floating current, nothing can be 
perhaps ever experienced as living if it does not contain a promise of something transcending life. 
Simmel’s last work, in particular its fourth chapter The Law of The Individual, can be then understood 
as an attempt to formulate a new vitalist ethics of the self, or at least a new vocabulary, which would 
allow to make a “linkage between individuality and lawfulness” (Simmel, 2010: 154) in an 
increasingly fragmented modern world, in which life and values themselves are in constant flux. 
In the context of Simmel’s intellectual biography, The View of Life has been read as the 
culmination of his lifelong philosophical oscillating between Nietzsche, Goethe, and Kant (Joas, 2000: 
77). The specific ways in which The Law of The Individual unfolds as a polemic with Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason have been widely analysed (see Ferrara, 1998: 62–69; Lee and Silver, 2012; Levine, 
2012; Lotter, 2000), but the Nietzschean overtone remains enigmatic, largely due to the 
methodological challenges that arise given Simmel’s tendency not to reveal his sources. This 
tendency has led to somewhat generic and overstated accounts of the proximity between Simmel 
and Nietzsche (see Kron, 2001; Lash, 2005), and speculations about the very origin of the phrase 
“individual law” (ein individuelles Gesetz) as supposedly taken from Nietzsche’s writings – either 
Genealogy of Morals or his late and controversial notebooks Nachlass, which have been published in 
English as The Will to Power (Steinmann, 2008: 214). Beyond such conjectures, it is unclear what are 
the precise ways in which Simmel’s life-philosophy is indebted to Nietzsche. The aim of this section is 
to bring The View of Life closer to Simmel’s previous critique, departing from an in-depth 
contextualization of Simmel’s three direct references to Nietzsche in his last work, which will 
ultimately point us towards broader resonances across The View of Life and Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche. 
In The View of Life, Simmel’s (2010) primary move is to dissolve Kant’s dualism alongside the 
framework of immanent life: the fundamental opposition between “life’s actuality and its Ought” is 
drawn only to be submerged under the “continuous and continually changing life-stream” (p. 137). 
The emerging synthesis of “more-life” and “more-than-life” converges towards a flux in which all 
social, cultural, and spiritual forms continuously dissolve. In philosophical terms, Simmel integrates 
here the doctrines of being and becoming, bridging the gap he previously found in Bergson’s 
philosophy, which viewed form as inherently antagonistic to life (see Levine, 2012: 40; Pyyhtinen, 
2010: 58–59). Simmel (2010) refers to Nietzsche for the first time precisely in the context of this gap, 
drawing on the doctrine of the will to power in a way which follows from his previous reading, with 
an emphasis on “individuality” which is “circumscribed by form” (p. 13). In doing so, he brings into 
focus the individualized, creative dimension involved in the process of mastering and negotiating 
social forms, rather than any physical expressions of power.  
Contextualizing Simmel’s reworking of the doctrine of the will to power brings us to the broader 
question about the rich set of intellectual traditions that find expression in The View of Life. Apart 
from Kant, French vitalism in particular has played an important role in the sharpening of Simmel’s 
philosophical standpoint. Various scholars have reconstructed the significance of this encounter 
drawing on Simmel’s essays on Bergson, in which Simmel rejects Bergson’s concept of flux that is 
directly graspable through the method of intuition, but still endorses his vitalist understanding of life 
beyond the activity of the will, as something cosmic and absolute (see Fitzi, 2002; Pyyhtinen, 2010: 
53–54). In this sense, Simmel’s life-philosophy surely opens up beyond the anthropocentric limit, but 
it is revealing that the Nietzschean doctrine of the will to power facilitates a link between the life-
form dualism and ethical individuality, rather than the broader metaphysics of nature. Bridging 
between individuality and the concept of life is of decisive importance for Simmel’s (1986) ethics as 
he insists that “the imperative that stands opposed to life seems unable to be ‘vital’” (p. 107) and 
thus bind the sovereign, modern individual to “moral” action through the demand of the very self-
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relation, rather than some abstract ideals. This is the context in which we find the second reference 
to Nietzsche: 
Even Nietzsche gave it life alone for content, to be sure, but the ideal form of the Ought still 
remained the “tablet” that is placed “above life.” It is still a question (not posed by Nietzsche 
himself) whether the Ought, vital in its form, could be an analog of life or a category under which 
life becomes aware of itself. 
 
(Simmel, 2010: 107) 
This passage makes clear that Nietzsche’s account of life-affirmation surely provides a point of 
departure for Simmel’s own framework of “the individual law”. Yet Simmel seems to complicate his 
previous critique of Nietzsche with his suggestion that Nietzsche as an “(im)moralist” was to some 
extent still dependent on the opposition between life and its ought-to in trying to remove “the 
meaning-giving goal of life from is illusory position outside of life,” as he described it back in 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Simmel, 1986: 6). Simmel makes a similar point in his article on 
Nietzsche from 1911 where he conceptualized Nietzschean ethics as a “third way” beyond Kant and 
Christianity, one in which “life itself” becomes a new “tablet” (Simmel, 2001: 171). In the passage 
above, Simmel seems to rehearse this argument, yet there is a crucial (if slightly surprising) twist, as 
his aim now is to dramatize his break with Nietzsche.  
Unlike Nietzsche, Simmel is not so much interested in rejecting the “ought” – or universalizing it in 
a Kantian fashion – as in formulating yet another “third way,” in which the “ought” would advance as 
a part of life. At first, one might conclude that this is a rhetorical move rather than a substantive 
argument, especially that Simmel previously embraced the Nietzschean “challenge to create a new 
law” in which life itself would be infused with “a new, positive, and relentlessly demanding ‘ought’” 
(Simmel, 1986: 160). But assuming that Simmel is well aware of the difference between him and 
Nietzsche (Joas, 2000: 82), and that understanding this difference on his own terms might reveal 
important nuances in his broader project, it is important to ask why would he only hint at such a 
commitment, and perhaps even exaggerate his distance from Nietzsche. 
The third (and last) reference to Nietzsche brings us closer to a plausible answer. The View of Life 
ends with an ambitious reworking of the doctrine of eternal return. For Simmel, the question is no 
longer whether life’s contradictions and tensions should be infinitely reaffirmed, but how to 
overcome the contingency of the moral claim upon the individual in the context of multiple points in 
one’s life-narrative: 
Instead of the truly bleak Nietzschean thought – “Can you desire that this action of yours recurs 
infinitely often?” – I propose: “Can you desire that this action of yours should define your entire 
life?” For the fact that it does so is not even a question, once the tearing of life into discontinuous 
“acts” is given up. 
 
(Simmel, 2010: 151) 
This is a crucial point in which the self-relation itself becomes pervasively moralized, but what is at 
stake in Simmel’s distinction between desiring an act to be repeated infinitely versus defining your 
entire life? At first, it might appear as a classical dichotomy of “essence versus accident” in the 
formulation of identity, but considering the relational character of Simmel’s thought (see Pyyhtinen, 
2010: 46–49), it is difficult to imagine that he would insist on some notion of a fundamental essence 
or truth. Placing the distinction in the broader framework of the “individual law” reveals significant 
nuances in Simmel’s rephrasing. Arguably, Simmel’s point is to dramatize the break with Kant’s 
reductionist understanding of moral duty which takes classes of isolated actions as its object. 
According to the “individual law,” acts and decisions cannot be evaluated according to any 
external and normative criteria which would be detached from the contexts of our own lives. The 
Dominika Partyga I London School of Economics I Department of Sociology 
 10 
argument rests on a relativistic understanding of truth as situated, temporal, and individualized: 
“whether something is valid as truth for us depends on the entire complex of principles, methods, 
and experimental contents known by us at that moment” (Simmel, 2010: 151). In other words, each 
moment is comprehensible only from within one’s life, not from the perspective of the third 
observer. The division of time into discrete moments is important here, as this is precisely where the 
difference between the past and future arises.  
This difference is anything but final: in the horizon of lived temporality, truth is intrinsically alive 
and unstable.5 As Simmel (2010) puts it, “every recognized truth alters the conditions by which it 
itself is recognized as truth” (p. 152). With such radical understanding, Simmel’s notion of the self 
moves beyond the classical “essence versus accident” dichotomy – one action can define an entire 
life in infinitely many ways, as it can be narrated from potentially contradictory perspectives, 
depending on the constellation of life’s events on the floating matrix of life. Eternity, as in Simmel’s 
reading of the Nietzschean doctrine, is not conceived as a refutation of time and becoming, but as a 
unity of becoming and passing – a bridge between the “infinity of becoming” and “finitude of being” 
(Simmel, 1986: 175). 
Contextualizing the distinction in this way shows that Simmel might have conceived of the 
Nietzschean doctrine as profoundly unsettling – to the extent that it brings back the burden and pain 
of the past – but it still lends itself to vitalist ethics. The arising question here is about the significance 
of Simmel’s rephrasing in the context of his critique of disinterested Kantian morality. Considering 
the interpretative tendency to place the “individual law” in the broader ‘Simmel and Nietzsche 
against Kant’ trajectory, it is hardly surprising that some argue for reading Simmel’s reworking as 
nothing less than a reversal of Kant’s categorical imperative (Steinmann, 2008: 215). This kind of 
interpretation is intuitive and plausible given Nietzsche’s famous rejection of the Kantian notions of 
virtue, duty, and the categorical imperative. Simmel himself quotes one of the most notorious 
passages from the Antichrist where Nietzsche dismissively refers to Kant as “the Chinese spirit of 
Konigsberg” (Simmel, 1992b: 147). Yet Simmel’s comparative article Nietzsche und Kant (1906), 
which explores subtle proximities between the philosophers, complicates this thesis in several ways. 
To be sure, Simmel is one of the few thinkers who examine the affinity between Nietzsche and 
Kant and in doing so, he remains attentive to the vast gap between them: Nietzsche’s “immanent” 
method and “intensely personal” thinking, Simmel (1993) argues, are “irreconcilable” with Kant’s 
transcendental orientation – particularly given Nietzsche’s call for revaluation of all values (p. 21).6 
Yet, he still insists that Nietzsche’s project can be understood as a radical transformation of Kant’s 
critique insofar as their philosophies are “comparable in their moral dimension,” the difference being 
that “while Kant’s quest is to formulate the existing morality, Nietzsche [...] aims to give it a new 
meaning” (Simmel, 1993: 18). For Simmel (1986), this is sharply illustrated in the doctrine of eternal 
return: like Kant’s categorical imperative, the Nietzschean doctrine involves the “endless repetition 
of action,” which comes to serve as the moral criteria (p. 170). The difference lies in the direction of 
the repetition – action gains moral worth either as it is generalized onto society, or affirmed from 
within the life of the individual. Ultimately, both Kant and Nietzsche have the same “goal” (Simmel, 
1993: 19), that is to overcome the contingency of values: nothing is to be willed “only-once,” but it is 
to be willed forever. 
Furthermore, Simmel draws analogies in their theories of value as a function of self-sacrifice. Just 
as Kant grounds morality in the “overcoming of the lower and sensous parts of our essence”, so does 
Nietzsche appeal to the extraordinary individual who masters his drives and passions towards the 
“elevation of humanity” (Simmel, 1986: 166). In this sense, Simmel (1986) concludes, “Nietzsche 
transforms Kant’s basic sentiment from an individual morality into an ethics of the species” (p. 166). 
This might be one of the most controversial moments in Simmel’s interpretation – particularly for 
those who insist that the Kantian notion of the split self is at odds with the Nietzschean affirmation 
of the embodied subject – but it is important to place Simmel’s argument in the broader context of 
his evolving views on society, individuality, and humanity.7 In his essay Kant und der Individualismus, 
Simmel (1995a) argues that Nietzsche’s account of the self in its emphasis on individual uniqueness, 
heroism and incomparability might have originally developed in “sharp contrast to Kant,” but 
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ultimately, Nietzsche takes the Kantian argument on self-mastery “one step further” (pp. 281–282). 
This is because the Nietzschean distinction between the conflicting vantage points of humanity and 
society is a “second solution” to the classical problem of freedom, which Kant overrides with his 
conception of the transcendental ego that must be freed from all social bonds (Simmel, 1995a: pp. 
280-282). In this sense, Nietzsche offers a promising radicalization of Kantian ethics with his ideals of 
self-mastery, nobility of mind and moral differentiation among individuals. Ultimately, Simmel (1964) 
goes as far as to argue that “Kant’s position was expanded, or conceived more profoundly, by 
Nietzsche” (p. 63).  
Leaving aside the question if Simmel’s line of argumentation can be defended, and if Nietzsche can 
(and should) be understood on Kantian terms, this analysis suggests a more nuanced web of ideas that 
connects Kant and Nietzsche, as seen from a distinctively Simmelian perspective. For Simmel, Nietzsche 
is to some extent still dependent on Kant insofar as the point of reference for his ethics is the moral 
quality of individual action, rather than the person as a whole (Joas, 2000: 82). This brings us to a 
slightly provocative yet plausible explanation why Nietzsche – as a “moralist” like Kant (Simmel, 1993a: 
18) – remains largely hidden in The View of Life. Ironically, Simmel might have been downplaying his 
intellectual debt to Nietzsche in order to dramatize his break with Kant. Ultimately, Nietzsche’s 
philosophy proves more helpful as a set of existential imperatives, which allow to recast the questions 
of substantive ethics under the light of the inner experience, than as a point of departure for 
challenging the Kantian legacy. Following this line of interpretation, we can finally consider the ways in 
which Simmel’s late thought might possibly bear a largely implicit Nietzschean imprint beyond the 
passages discussed above. 
One of the most striking resonances across Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and The View of Life is the 
overarching metaphor of self-overcoming. In the opening chapter of The View of Life, Simmel (2010) 
proclaims that the central “task of the moral individual” is “to overcome himself” (p. 5), drawing 
perhaps on his previous interpretation of the Nietzchean doctrine of the Übermensch: “as long as 
man is a being who can evolve, the task that is inherent to the concept of the overman can never be 
definitively fulfilled” (Simmel, 1986: 175). This metaphor underscores Simmel’s open-ended 
understanding of subjectivity which unfolds “in a wholly fluid, intuitive way” (2010: 107) as a function 
of lived unification: “actions mostly occur as something internally integrated, something deeply 
emergent” (2010: 108). In this sense, the “individual law” is better understood as a self-organizing 
form, elusive in its totality, rather than as an end product of some intentional and purposive acts of 
valuation. The Nietzschean concept of self-responsibility that “springs from the depth of one’s own 
being” (Simmel, 1986: 170) finds its subtle expression in Simmel’s ideal: sovereign individuality 
unfolds with “the rhythm in which life pours forth from its deepest wellspring” (Simmel, 2010: 109).  
Problematizing the classical link between will and action in this way rests on an open-ended 
concept of evolution. In The View of Life, evolution is understood not “narrowly to imply the 
apparent necessity of a definable evolutionary goal” but as an “immanent quality of [...] the process, 
independent of any goal” (Simmel, 2010: 110). This resonates clearly with Simmel’s previous 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s mature thought, in which evolution “is not determined by its final goal” 
(Simmel, 1986: 7). In this sense, engaging with Nietzsche (among others) allows Simmel to move 
beyond the neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory of value towards creative evolutionism (see Lash, 
2006: 5). This kind of emancipation from purposiveness has important implications for the “individual 
law” as Simmel (2010) seems to be rehearsing some of the Nietzschean suspicions against 
rationalized accounts of the self: the “forward-striving direction of life”, he argues, cannot be 
translated into static practices of the self which would turn the “perfection of true personality” into 
an end-goal (p. 150).  
In this sense, Simmel’s life-philosophy eludes the socio-psychological discourse of self-
improvement, not least because of the tensions inherent in the notion of an “ideal self:” the 
individual law unfolds with “ceaselessly changing often perhaps logically mutually contradictory 
actions” (Simmel, 2010: 138). Moreover, Simmel (2010) seems to be sceptical of the very notion of 
intentionality, which is evident in his reworking of the doctrine of the will to power understood as 
the creative flow of life which “rinses out of itself to a certain intensity of will and application of 
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power” (p. 112). Seen via a life-philosophical lens, Simmel’s Nietzsche transposes the transcendental 
Kantian “ought” onto the floating matrix of life, and posits a subject who is no longer self-identical, 
breaking with the classical view of the reason-centred commanding will. 
The central problem of Simmel’s life-philosophy is then how to reconcile this flow of life, in which 
all provisional forms are ultimately compromised, with a search for a binding yet flexible self-
narrative – or more broadly, an affirmative relation to one’s own finitude. This ambiguity lies at the 
heart of Simmel’s (2010) figure of a “completely moral person:” living through various momentarily 
enacted forms “in the endless variability and unpredictability of life itself,” he tends “not to ask 
whether each of these instants belongs under a law formed beyond himself” (p. 109). In the 
background, there is again the shadow of the Übermensch who “doesn’t think much of ‘callings’, the 
reason being he knows himself called, [...] he gives no thought whatsoever to being ‘finished and 
ready’” (Nietzsche, 1990: 75). Distinguishing between two modes of being, Simmel (2010) draws on 
the concept of the nobility of mind: “entire coherence of life is different for a person who is moral 
(and not only does the moral thing) than for the person who is otherwise qualified” (p. 109). This 
brings us back to the question about the meaning and significance of narrative coherence in the 
context of Simmel’s radical understanding of truth and lived temporality. 
Simmel’s insistence on “unitary” throughout The View of Life might at first seem at odds with the 
Nietzschean multiplicity of forms, particularly in the postmodern reading which celebrates decentred 
pluralism as one of Nietzsche’s insights (see Gemes, 2001). One does not need to get ahead of 
Simmel and seek refuge in Deleuze or Derrida to clarify this point – there are traces of the 
Nietzschean suspicion against a unitary voice in Simmel’s (1992a) own interpretation of the figure of 
the philosopher, whose courage to live without a sense of resolution in the “dangerous proximity of 
the Übermensch” he clearly admires (p. 129), and perhaps even projects into his own understanding 
of Christianity as a site of struggle. This image suggests significant nuances in Simmel’s conception of 
unity: much less than a total reconciliation of life’s tensions, it is a constantly deferred axis from 
which unification can potentially take place.  
What is at stake here is neither the aesthetic ideal of unity nor even the concept of autonomy that 
emerges out of the (violent) sublimation of one’s conflicting drives, but the broader problem of self-
mastery which comes from within: sovereign individuality involves “the unity and wholeness that is 
experienced consistently through all of the multiplicity or particular acts, or more exactly, that lives 
as this multiplicity” (Simmel, 2010: 130). In this sense, Simmel is not so much interested in disrupting 
the notion of a unified self, but in a mode of vital self-affirmation that involves a variety of 
influences, contradictory beliefs, and perhaps even irreconcilable instincts. Narrative coherence, 
which distinguishes the moral individual from the “crowd,” Simmel (2010) argues, does not preclude 
taking on “a particular inner attitude in one epoch of his life, and an utterly divergent one in another 
– and so on in infinite possible variants” (p. 133). While the claim upon the individual might be 
differentiated over the course of her or his lifetime – “subject to development, evolution, change” 
(Simmel, 2010: 110) – it is lived through in a profoundly continuous manner, as if life was never 
subordinate to an object or goal that would exceed it. 
Ultimately, the resonances across Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and The View of Life bring into 
sharper focus the “creative aspect of the ethical realm” (Simmel, 2010: 152) which opens up with 
the attempt to ground moral value in the life process. Reading Nietzsche in a way that emphasizes 
his Kantianism, Simmel underscores the conception of man as a creative and sovereign knowing 
and acting subject, but he follows Nietzsche in recognizing finitude as the necessary precondition 
for the genesis of values. With his reworking of the doctrine of the eternal return, Simmel 
reconsiders on his own terms the various ways in which an individual’s relation to her own 
temporality becomes pervasively moralized: expansive life “makes not only the act but also the 
Ought of every moment into the heir and bearer of responsibility of all that we have ever been, 
done, and been obliged to” (Simmel, 2010: 154). The difference between the past and future here 
is anything but final, as each moment, understood as a brief unity of passing and becoming, calls 
for its transcendence. This makes evident “the difficulties of ethical choice” (Simmel, 2010: 152), 
which has to be constantly relived in changing social contexts, without recourse to duty, God(s), 
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and moral constants. In this sense, the open-ended character of the “individual law” points us 
towards the new possibilities for affirmation that open up with the stark realization that the 
subject is no longer dependent on a singular truth. 
Conclusion: Sociological implications 
The encounter between Nietzsche and Simmel surely testifies to the impossibility of conceiving of 
the subject as the nexus of ethics in transcendental and ahistorical terms, but it is less clear what is at 
stake here in terms of Simmel’s social theory. This is the focus of the last section, which considers the 
broader significance of Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche following the integrative line of critique 
which attempts to reconcile between the philosophical and sociological polarities in Simmel’s 
thought (Kemple, 2007; Lash, 2005; Lee and Silver, 2012). The aim is not to suggest an entirely new 
direction for future inquiry, but to place Simmel’s critique alongside his writings on society, war, 
aesthetics, and ethics, in order to think through the framework of life in relation to the social. 
Despite the recent vitalist turn in Simmel scholarship, the connection between Simmel’s social and 
moral theory remains ambiguous, and perhaps all the more significant considering the tendency to 
celebrate either form or life at each other’s expense (Levine, 2012: 7; Swedberg and Reich, 2010: 31). 
In this context, Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche is revealing in several ways, not least because it 
allows us to read more continuity into his socio-metaphysical project. For Simmel, both as a 
philosopher of life and a sociologist of form, the structures of human existence are nothing but static. 
Indeed, his understanding of the relationship between the self, society, and humanity in 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche foreshadows the ways in which dynamism associated with the concept 
of sociation will be later transposed onto the vitalist vocabulary: 
In reality “society” is but one of these forms through which humanity plays out its power, its vital 
contents, and its interests, and it could do the same thing through the forms of individual 
existence, objective spiritual contents, “natural” existence, and the relations between religious 
and metaphysical fundaments. 
 
(Simmel, 1986: 144). 
The View of Life can be perhaps read as this kind of thought experiment, in which the premises of 
Simmel’s sociology become reversed, as the focus of his inquiry shifts from the social to those forms 
of individual existence which can be expressed in vitalist terms alongside the life-form dualism. 
Simmel’s last work might then seem far from social theory as traditionally defined, but it 
nevertheless points towards fruitful connections and tensions which underpin his broader socio-
philosophical project. 
Some of these tensions have been recently explored under the framework of “sociological 
metaphysics” understood as an “idiom of thinking in Simmel’s work encompassing core ideas and 
basic problems central to the modernist project of critical reflexive knowledge about the social 
conditions of human existence” (Harrington and Kemple, 2012: 10). In this vein, we can read 
Simmel’s critique of Nietzsche as one of the sites where Simmel explores his longstanding interest in 
the dynamics of individual experience and ethical agency in an increasingly fragmented modern 
culture. As David Frisby (1987: 907) argues, the Nietzschean distinction between the vantage points 
of humanity and society clearly resonates with Simmel’s famous essay How is Society Possible? which 
problematizes the relationship between the self and society as unthinkable without each other: 
“what kind a person’s socialized being is, is determined or co-determined by the kind of one’s 
unsocialized being” (Simmel, 2009: 45). Lee and Silver (2012: 137) argue that the self-relation 
emerging from The View of Life can be incorporated into the framework of formal sociology precisely 
via Simmel’s discussion of the second a priori in How is Society Possible?. This is where we encounter 
one of the ontological conditions that make the society possible: life which is not entirely social, 
unique being-for-itself, a distinct “I.” 
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In his moral theory, Simmel elevates this aspect of life to the very precondition for ethics: if one 
apprehends the ego “in the inner uniqueness or solitude in which it is experienced,” Simmel (2010: 
115) argues, “then morality itself originates from the point where the person is alone with himself.” 
At the first glance one might conclude that this is an antithesis to the classical view in social theory, 
which underscores the moral superiority of the society over the individual. Simmel surely breaks with 
this tradition, but crucially, not to replace the concept of the society with that of the individual and 
thus fall into the trap of dualistic thinking.8 This brings us to one of the most striking aspects of 
Simmel’s broader project, which can be neither grasped in terms proposed by symbolic 
interactionists (such as Cooley and Mead), who view the self as socially constructed, nor in terms of 
the zero-sum relationship between the individual and society. Simmel’s life-philosophical perspective 
on subjectivity can be best understood in contrast to Durkheim’s conception of homo duplex in which 
the social and the individual function as antagonistic forces (see Pyyhtinen, 2008: 282–295; 2010: 
140–144). Unlike Durkheim, Simmel conceives of the self as unified rather than internally divided, 
both in his discussion of the second and third a priori in How is Society Possible? and in The View of 
Life, where he insists on conceptualizing the individual as a “living unity” (Simmel, 2010: 147), a 
synthesis via which various dualities - being and becoming, mind and body, life and form - 
continuously dissolve. 
Contextualizing Simmel’s views on the subject as a locus of morality reveals a more subtle account 
of ethical individualism, one which transcends both the quantitative and qualitative forms that 
individualism took in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (see Pyyhtinen, 2008). Indeed, insisting 
on the “double incomparability” of the individual, Simmel (2010) puts forward a positive concept of 
the self: “only when we cease being a mere product and cross point of external forces and become a 
being that develops out of his own ego, can we be responsible” (p. 147). Simmel rejects here the 
Kantian quantitative understanding in which the transcendental subject is nothing but an abstraction 
of social ties because it fails to capture the sense in which individuals experience moral demands 
precisely when they recognize themselves as ethical subjects beyond social norms. Yet he 
simultaneously moves beyond the romantic myth of the self-enclosed individual whose only aim is 
the egocentric cultivation of originality: “the concept of the individual law requires the most decisive 
statement that the sense of individuality which first presents itself – being-other and being-special, 
the qualitative incomparability of the particular, is not in question here” (Simmel, 2010: 147). One of 
the most striking claims Simmel (2010) makes in this context is that individual uniqueness cannot be 
conceived in terms of “difference [...] from what is shared with other individuals” (p. 147). The 
dangers implicit in such idea are exemplified in the ways in which the German youth distorted the 
Nietzschean philosophy as a simple formula “to be otherwise” (Simmel, 1994: 14). 
Simmel’s own critical engagement with Nietzche’s ideals of humanity, evolution, and nobility of 
mind paves the way towards a more nuanced understanding of ethical individualism beyond the 
classical opposition of social structure and individual personality. According to Kron (2001), the 
“individual law” should be understood as nothing less than a synthesis of quantitative and qualitative 
forms of individualism, which draws out sociological implications from Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. 
Considering the ambivalent role of Kant, this is perhaps a slightly reductive reading, but Simmel’s 
reworking of the doctrines of the eternal return and the will to power surely hints at the various ways 
in which the flux of life produces both sociality and individuality.  
In this respect, Simmel’s life-philosophy reverberates with tensions that underpin his arguments 
on the third a priori, conceptually perfect society and “sociological metaphysics” in Soziologie. This is 
where Simmel has famously suggested a counterintuitive link: the diversity of social elements 
ensures the unique position of the individual within the society. In other words, the ontological unity 
of the society presumes an unattainable ideal of a pervasive harmony between the individual and 
society, as illustrated in the notion of a vocation underwriting the modern division of labour: “a 
position-and-performance in society for each person, to which one is called, and an imperative to 
search for it” (Simmel, 2009: 51).9 While the third a priori, in its original formulation, has a regulative 
rather than ethical function – insofar as the perfect harmony is constantly deferred – a reading of 
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Simmel’s life-philosophy via a Nietzschean lens helps to articulate what the “unique position” of the 
individual might potentially entail in socio-metaphysical terms. 
For Simmel’s life-philosophical conception of individuality invokes a parallel image of an 
unattainable axis. The difference lies in the distance from the subject: the conceptual axis towards 
which all individual activities converge in the conceptually perfect society is now brought to the life-
process itself. In elevating life itself to the status of the absolute, Simmel uncovers how life’s details 
converge towards a unified yet elusive totality, and begins to problematize the question of self-
knowledge as one which cannot be answered without questioning the distinction between the object 
of knowledge and the subject of experience. In this sense, subjectivity can be neither understood in 
terms of essential or relational difference under the conditions of social differentiation nor via the 
solipsistic view of the self as self-enclosed, unique and singular. The non-sociated dimension of life, 
irreducible to any generic form and unthinkable in itself, emerges as the very ethical precondition of 
the society. 
In The View of Life, the category of social (inter)action might be then obscured (Joas, 2000: 83), 
but this is perhaps the point, if ethical agency is to unfold alongside rather than in opposition to the 
society: the “ought” appears simultaneously individualized and historically contingent – “determined 
in each case historically and psychologically” (Simmel, 2010: 102).10 Simmel (2010) illustrates the 
interweaving of the personal and the social with the example of an antimilitarist who is ethically 
obliged to perform his military duty, although his “subjective moral consciousness condemns it” (p. 
143). The social is hardly neglected here: “individuality that lives in the form of the Ought is not 
something ahistorical, nonmaterial, or only consisting of so-called character” (Simmel, 2010: 143). 
Placing this passage in the context of Simmel’s war writings, which explore the coming together of 
individuality and society, helps to clarify what is at stake here. In the absolute situation of war, the 
military duty is no longer externally imposed by the state but turns into a moral imperative that 
comes from within, as the individual recovers a sense of belonging to the broader socio-cultural 
totality (Simmel, 2007). The First World War should be then understood in proto-existentialist terms, 
as a call for individual responsibility, a chance for Germans to actualize their “true” (i.e. historically 
contingent) potential alongside the maxim “Become What You Are” (Simmel, 2007). Reworking 
Nietzsche’s dictum as a reminder of an ethical duty to embrace the test of national belonging comes 
dangerously close to war propaganda packaged as moral philosophy, but, more importantly, it also 
points towards broader resonances between The View of Life and Simmel’s writings on Germany and 
the Great War. 
The Nietzchean problem of living historically is central in this context (see Watier, 1994: 281), 
although Simmel presumably downplays Nietzsche’s scepticism about its viability in a decadent 
culture in which life itself is inevitably impoverished (see Weinstein and Weinstein, 1993: 174–176). 
For Simmel, the direction of history under the impact of war is no longer towards life’s disintegration, 
as man is called into responsibility for the whole. In other words, war transforms life into an 
affirmative experience in which acts of individual courage, self-sacrifice, and creativity emerge as the 
very precondition for society, or at least as ways of advancing humanity. If this is the most authentic 
moment in the life of an antimilitarist, then the subject proves to be nothing without history. In this 
sense, the absolute situation of war exemplifies the ways in which integrative cultural, social, and 
political forms create individual personalities that are no longer disjointed, when the boundaries 
between morals and life, self and society, and subjective and objective value ultimately dissolve. 
Simmel’s ideal of an individual who is perfectly integrated into the social whole should be then 
understood not only as a neo-Kantian fiction that secures the ontological unity of society, nor even as 
an aesthetic ideal of unity, but as an ethical imperative in a broadly Nietzschean vein that takes us 
beyond the opposition between individuality and normativity (society). 
This is where we encounter the limit edge of Simmel’s life-philosophy: with his ideal of a synthesis, 
Simmel does not even consider the broader problem of locating the individual in a morally irrational 
whole, nor does he seem to think that the authority of the state or that the direction of society might 
(or should) be put into question. This is perhaps an effect of the gap between Simmel’s social and 
moral thought, or of the broader separation of sociology and philosophy as academic disciplines, but 
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it suggests an interesting direction for future comparative inquiry, as the question of political 
authority in an ethically irrational world finds a more sustained treatment in Weber’s reading of 
Nietzsche (see Shaw, 2014). Moving on to the twentieth century, Simmel’s insights foreshadow the 
ways in which concerns around the epistemic location of the synthesizing subject, the biosocial limits 
of life, and the production of ethical agency in the context of multiple (regimes of) truths will haunt 
contemporary thinkers, most famously exemplified in the works of Michel Foucault. 
Simmel’s Nietzsche opens up a critical but elusive space in classical sociology, perhaps the blind 
spot in our field of vision, as we enter the terrain of ethical individualism that breaks with the 
institutional, structural, and normative foundations of morality. In this matrix of ideas, society is 
anything but morally superior to the individual, yet both terms should be radically revised given the 
metaphysical privilege of the immanent life-force over the commanding will. In this sense, 
recognizing the Nietzschean debt complicates contemporary reconstructions of Simmel’s ethics of 
relational individuality, as Simmel’s radical understanding of truth is inconsistent with rationalized 
and static accounts of the self. Similarly, there are various tensions that open up with the attempt to 
think through the intelligibility of the self-relation through the framework of sociological vitalism. 
Seen via Simmel’s Nietzchean lens, the life-force fuels ethical individualism rather than post-human 
politics of the flux. This is not to argue that the vitalist readings are less relevant, but to underscore 
the importance of some fundamental questions about the relations between the self, social order, 
and human values that lie at the heart of Simmel’s engagement with Nietzsche. 
The resonances across Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and The View of Life suggest that there is a lot 
classical sociology can gain from a more sustained dialogue with philosophy, at least if we follow 
Simmel’s life-philosophical insights that transgress the naturalized boundaries between social 
ontology, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Despite the recent calls for reconsidering the 
relationship between classical sociology and social philosophy (see Ferrara, 1998: 61; Pyyhtinen, 
2008: 296), there is still a vast gap between them, as evidenced in the contemporary scholarship on 
Simmel who considered himself a philosopher, yet gets attention only from sociologists. Perhaps a 
good starting point for rethinking this relationship is Simmel’s (1964) notion of philosophical 
sociology which he began to formulate in 1917 with a set of open-ended questions: 
Is society the purpose of human existence, or is it a means for the individual? Does the ultimate 
value of social development lie in the unfolding of personality or of association? Do meaning and 
purpose inhere in social phenomena at all, or exclusively in individuals? 
 
(p. 24) 
We might be tempted to dismiss these questions as obsolete, but Simmel’s encounter with Nietzsche 
signifies a promise of rephrasing them in productive and novel ways, as we inhabit a space on the 
edge of classical social thought. 
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Notes 
1. Frisby (1987) offers the most comprehensive overview of Simmel’s critical engagement with 
Nietzsche (missing only the 1911 article): “Simmel published articles on aspects of his life and 
work in 1895, 1896, 1897 (a defence of Nietzsche against Tönnies’ attack), 1903, and 1906, as 
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well as lecturing on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche directly from 1901 onwards” (p. 906). These 
lectures offer material for further inquiry: see Weinstein and Weinstein (1993) for a Nietzschean 
reading of Simmel’s lecture from 1904 “On the History of Philosophy” (pp. 171–185). This article 
involves quotes from all of the articles cited above, translated by the author. 
2. Despite the primacy of negative responses to Nietzsche among Simmel’s contemporaries 
(Weinstein and Weinstein, 1993: 173), the reception of Nietzschean philosophy by early German 
sociologists is of course highly differentiated: see Solms-Laubach (2007) for detailed discussion. 
3. See Rogers (2001) and Loeb (2010: 13–16) for a critical assessment of the argument that the 
doctrine of the eternal return is conceptually incoherent. 
4. See Dodd (2012: 153) for a distinction between the absolute and relative kinds of equality, 
associated respectively with the aesthetically and conceptually perfect society. 
5. Simmel’s understanding of time in The View of Life resonates with the ways in which temporality, 
life, and death are conceptualized by Deleuze and Heidegger (see Darmon and Frade, 2012; 
Pyyhtinen, 2012). 
6. See Hill (2003), Sokoloff (2006), and Rayman (2013) for contemporary discussions on the Kantian 
foundations of Nietzsche’s thought, the question if Nietzsche arrived at some of his most 
characteristic doctrines in response to Kantian critiques and whether their views on action, 
morality, and degrees of self-mastery are in some ways compatible. 
7. Simmel (2010) rejects the Kantian notion of the split self as “undemonstrated, naively dogmatic 
claim” which rests on a false assumption that the “rational, universally valid part of us is the 
‘true’ I” (p. 107). Seen from Simmel’s own standpoint of unified individuality, Kant posits a false 
dichotomy between the mind and the body by “tearing an individual apart into sensuousness 
and reason” (p. 106). Simmel insists that such dualism is deeply problematic insofar as it 
rationalizes, idealizes, and diminishes the lived experience. 
8. Standard positivistic readings of Durkheim’s theory of moral individualism, collective conscience, 
and organic solidarity illustrate the dangers inherent in conceiving of the society as a sacred 
source of morality – see Bowring (2016) for a critical assessment. 
9. At the first glance we might conclude that Simmel offers here a similar view on the relationship 
between social differentiation and social cohesion as the one developed by Durkheim in The 
Division of Labour in Society with his notion of organic solidarity to the extent that the 
diversification of the society and individual personality are positively correlated for both thinkers. 
The parallel is viable in relation to Simmel’s notion of quantitative individuality, but not if we 
consider that Durkheim conceives of the social and individual as antagonistic forces with his 
conception of homo duplex (Pyyhtinen, 2008: 295). While Durkheim’s ethical individualism binds 
the individual to the collective, Simmel’s “individual law” rejects moral obligation which comes 
from outside the agent. 
10. Simmel (2010) refers to the Ought as a “categorical Ur-phänomen” to ground its objective 
character (p. 102). See Dodd (2008) for a critical discussion of the concept of Ur-phänomen in 
Simmel’s broader project. 
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